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ABSTRACT: Robbery is a somewhat unusual offence in the sense that it combines two 
distinct wrongs: an offence against property and an offence against the person. It is 
also a particularly broad crime since it does not distinguish between different levels 
of force which might be used against the person. Consequently, the defendant who 
uses a slight push in order to steal a bag, commits the same offence as a masked gang 
who enters a bank whilst in possession of firearms, making off with substantial 
amounts of cash in the process. As such, the current definition of robbery conflicts 
with the principle of fair labelling which seeks to ensure that crimes are defined to 
reflect their wrongfulness and severity. This article explores options to reform robbery 
in order to bring it in line with the principle of fair labelling. Ultimately, it argues that 
the scope of the offence should be narrowed by incorporating a minimum-force 
threshold so that offences involving low levels of force cease to be regarded as 
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It is now 15 years since Andrew Ashworth wrote his seminal ‘Robbery Re-assessed’1 in 
which he argued that the offence of robbery is too broadly defined, calling for it to be 
re-cast in order to properly distinguish between offences involving different levels of 
harm: ‘Where force or the threat of force is used in order to steal, the category of 
robbery covers everything from a push or a raised hand in order to snatch a bag, to 
the most violent robbery of a security vehicle with guns fired and so forth.’2 As such, 
Ashworth argued that the current definition of robbery is ‘objectionable because it 
fails to mark in a public way the distinction between a mere push and serious 
violence’,3 and that robbery is therefore too vague and is liable to stereotypical 
interpretations which risk misrepresenting the true nature of the offender’s conduct.4 
To redress the generality in the law, Ashworth suggests that the offence should be 
sub-divided ‘into at least two degrees’5 so as to more accurately reflect and describe 
the nature of the offence committed, allowing the law to properly distinguish the most 
serious forms of robbery from those involving lower degrees of force. 
 
The present article similarly argues that the offence of robbery is too widely defined 
and is in need of reform. However, rather than dividing the offence into two or more 
narrower forms of robbery, it is argued here that the scope of the offence should be 
limited by incorporating a minimum force-threshold so that offences involving low 
                                                     
1 A. Ashworth, ‘Robbery Re-assessed’ [2002] Crim LR 851 
2 Ibid. at 855 
3 Ibid. at 856 
4 Ibid. at 856 
5 Ibid. at 871 
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levels of force are no longer regarded as robberies and are instead treated as thefts, 
with the use of force constituting an aggravating factor taken into consideration at the 
sentencing stage. It is argued here that the use of minimal force does not sufficiently 
change the nature of the offence vis-à-vis a non-forceful taking, and so treating 
minimal-force thefts as robberies represents an unnecessary contravention of the 
principle of fair labelling.  
 
Since ‘Robbery Re-assessed’, the law has developed only very little through judicial 
statements to the effect that using a level of force which is only sufficient to take 
possession of property from an unresisting owner may not constitute robbery. Thus 
in DPP v RP6, the offender could not be guilty of robbery when he snatched a cigarette 
from the victim’s hand, since it could not be said that the act amounted to force used 
against a person for the purposes of robbery. The reasons behind this decision will be 
considered later, but for the time being, it is enough to say that this decision may have 
the effect of removing from the scope of robbery those offences where the level of 
force used is sufficient only to take possession from an unresisting owner. That said, 
it is questionable whether such minimal-force takings were ever intended to fall within 
the scope of robbery. The Criminal Law Revision Committee, upon whose report the 
Theft Act 1968 was largely based, did not regard the ‘mere snatching of 
property…from an unresisting owner as using force for the purposes of robbery.’7 This 
                                                     
6 [2012] EWHC 1657 (Admin) 
7 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eighth Report: Theft and Related Offences, Report Cm 2977 
(1966) page 65 
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view appears in much of the academic commentary since the Act came into force. A. 
T. H. Smith points to a strong argument that force used merely to obtain possession, 
and not to overcome or prevent resistance, is insufficient for robbery.8 But even if 
such cases are removed from the offence, robbery remains a troubling one. The single 
offence is used to cover a wide range of harm levels, from low-value street muggings 
involving little or no injury, to large-value organised and armed bank robberies. 
 
 
The offence of robbery 
Robbery was originally an offence at common law, but is now defined in section 8 of 
the Theft Act 1968: 
(1) A person is guilty of robbery if he steals and, immediately before or at the time of 
doing so, and in order to do so, he uses force on any person or puts or seeks to put any 
person in fear of being then and there subjected to force. 
(2) A person guilty of robbery, or of assault with intent to rob, shall on conviction on 
indictment be liable to imprisonment for life. 
 
Robbery is therefore an offence based on two wrongful acts - theft and the use or 
threatened use of force - committed during a single ‘transaction’ or ‘venture’.9 In this 
respect, robbery is somewhat unusual in that it combines a property offence with an 
                                                     
8 A.T.H. Smith, Property Offences (Sweet and Maxwell, 1994) 405. 
9 B. Mitchell, ‘Multiple Wrongdoing and Offence Structure: A Plea for Consistency and Fair Labelling’ 
(2001) 64(3) MLR 393 at 396. 
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offence against the person.10 The maximum penalty of life imprisonment for robbery 
is significantly greater than the punishments available for the constituent offences of 
theft and assault,11 and a number of possible justifications have been put forward for 
this. 
 
First, the use of force may make completion of the theft more likely.12 This in itself is 
unconvincing as it implies that the criminalisation of robbery is principally concerned 
with reducing the incidence of theft. It does not explain why the maximum penalty for 
robbery is greater than that for theft if the law is primarily concerned with preventing 
complete thefts. Second, the use of threat of force makes the theft more highly 
motivated, and risks exposing the victim to greater injury and to a different type of 
harm. There is obvious merit in this argument, yet it fails to fully recognise the causal 
relationship between the theft and assault as required for robbery. A defendant who 
steals the victim’s property and then opportunistically commits an assault is not guilty 
of robbery as the force is not used in order to facilitate the theft – the theft is complete 
without recourse to the use of force. Nevertheless, the victim here suffers two types 
of harm: deprivation of property and physical injury; the same types (and perhaps the 
                                                     
10 A.P. Simester & G.R. Sullivan, ‘On the Nature and Rationale of Property Offences’, in R.A. Duff & S. 
Green (eds), Defining Crimes: Essays on the Special Part of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 
2005) 194 
11 Robbery might also be committed where very serious violence is used, constituting grievous bodily 
harm with intent, for which the maximum sentence is also life imprisonment (Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861, s.18). 
12 Simester & Sullivan, above n.10 at 194 
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same degrees) of harm as suffered by the robbery victim, yet no robbery is committed. 
In this sense, robbery is more than the sum of its parts: it is more than merely a theft 
and an assault. The rationale for robbery ought to recognise the causal relationship 
between the theft and the force. More convincingly perhaps, it has been argued that 
the use or threatened use of force, which is inextricably linked to a theft, 
fundamentally changes the moral character of the offence from a simple theft to an 
offence which threatens both property rights and personal integrity.13 A person who 
uses force during the course of a theft demonstrates not only a dishonest character, 
but a violent one also.  
 
To be guilty of robbery, the prosecution must prove that the defendant used force on 
any person (not necessarily the victim of the theft), threatened to use force, or sought 
to put another person in fear of force being used.14 The Act does not define force, nor 
does it quantify the level of force required.15 It has been left to the jury to decide 
whether the level of forced used is sufficient to constitute robbery. In Dawson and 
                                                     
13 A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, G.R. Sullivan & G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Doctrine 
and Theory (Hart, 5th ed, 2013) 575-576 
14 Any threat must relate to an immediate use of force; a threat of the future use of force in order to 
facilitate a theft may constitute blackmail contrary to the Theft Act 1968, s.21. 
15 Interestingly, it is generally agreed that the term ‘force’ is wider than ‘violence’, so a robbery may 
occur where the offender pins down the victim during the course of the theft; whilst his act does not 
constitute violence, he has used force through the exercise of physical strength. See D. Ormerod & 
D.H. Williams, Smith’s Law of Theft (Oxford University Press, 9th ed, 2007) at 239 
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James,16 the Court of Appeal held that the jury had been entitled to convict of robbery 
where the defendant had nudged the victim, causing him to lose his balance and 
thereby making it easier for the defendant to steal his wallet. Similarly, the Court of 
Appeal in Clouden17 held that whether the defendant’s act of wrenching the victim’s 
shopping basket from her hand constituted the use of force for the purposes of a 
robbery conviction was a matter for the jury and as such, the jury had been entitled 
to convict on that basis.18 The term ‘force’ has therefore been interpreted widely by 
the courts so as to include only the slight force used in a nudge or slight push. The 
effect of this is to regard such offences involving only slight force as robberies rather 
than thefts, thereby placing them in a category of offence which carries life 
imprisonment as its maximum sentence.19 One limitation has however been placed 
on the level of force required for a robbery conviction. In DPP v RP,20 the Court held 
that snatching a cigarette from the hand of the victim with no physical contact 
between the two, is incapable of amounting to a robbery as the act does not amount 
to the use of force. Whilst the verdict may be correct, the reasoning behind it should 
                                                     
16 (1977) 64 Cr App R 170 
17 [1987] Crim LR 56 
18 In Corcoran v Anderton (1980) 71 Cr App R 104, the defendant had snatched the victim’s handbag 
by force. The bag fell to the floor and the defendant fled empty-handed. The Court held that he could 
still be convicted of robbery as theft does not rely on actual permanent deprivation, only the 
intention to permanently deprive, and the snatching constituted both an appropriation of property 
and the use of force. 
19 Ashworth, above n.1 at 855. 
20 [2012] EWHC 1657 (Admin). 
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be treated with some caution The High Court supported its conclusion by reference to 
an argument that snatching a cigarette ‘cannot cause any pain unless, perhaps, the 
person resists strongly, in which case one would expect inevitably there would be 
direct physical contact between the thief and the victim as well’, 21 yet the definition 
of robbery does not require any such physical contact between the parties. 
 
There has been considerable academic criticism of the decisions in Clouden and 
Dawson & James which upheld robbery convictions for cases involving relatively little 
force used in pursuit of the theft: 
‘…it may well be thought that conduct such as that in [Clouden] is more akin to that 
of a pickpocket than a bank robber and it is quite adequately dealt with by the offence 
of theft which is, after all, punishable with a maximum of [seven] years’ 
imprisonment.’22 
 
That said, not all commentators share the view that bag-snatching is comparable to 
pickpocketing: some suggest that bag-snatching should rightly be regarded as robbery 
because snatching will involve some force exerted on the person, whereas the 
pickpocket will not usually be guilty of robbery because he acts not with force but with 
stealth.23 Nevertheless the Criminal Law Revision Committee, upon whose report the 
                                                     
21 Per Mitting J at [15]. The definition of the offence does not require pain, merely the use of force; 
see D. Ormerod, ‘DPP v RP Case Comment’ [2013] Crim LR 151 at 152 
22 J.C. Smith, ‘R v Clouden: Case Commentary’ [1987] Crim LR 56 at 57 
23 Ormerod & Williams, above n.15 at 240 
9 
 
Theft Act was largely based,24 was of the opinion that bag-snatching from an 
unresisting victim should not be regarded as using force for the purposes of robbery, 
although it might constitute a robbery where the owner put up some resistance 
against the offender,25 grappling to retain possession of the property.   
 
The principle of fair labelling 
 When a crime is committed, it is not enough that an offender be convicted of 
something, what matters is of what he has been convicted.26 To achieve this, the law 
must distinguish between different types of offending and varying degrees of 
wrongdoing, and offences need to be sufficiently narrow and appropriately labelled 
so as to represent the nature and seriousness of the criminal behaviour.27 The criminal 
law could theoretically operate with a relatively small number of widely-defined 
offences, ‘but we shrink from this in the belief that the label applied to an offence 
ought fairly to present the offender’s wrongdoing.’28 More accurately defined and 
                                                     
24 The suggested definition put forward by the Committee was, a person will be guilty of robbery ‘if he 
steals and in order to do so, wilfully uses force on any person or wilfully puts or seeks to put any 
person in fear of being subjected to force.’ The words ‘then and there’ were subsequently added, and 
the word ‘wilfully’ was removed. See Criminal Law Revision Committee, above n. 7 at para. 65 
25 Criminal Law Revision Committee, above n. 7 at para. 65 
26 J. Horder, ‘Rethinking Non-Fatal Offences against the Person’ (1994) 14(3) OJLS 335 at 351 
27 S. Demetriou, ‘Not Giving Up the Fight: A Review of the Law Commission’s Scoping Report on Non-
fatal Offences Against the Person’ (2016) 80(3) Journal of Criminal Law 188 at 192 
28 A. Ashworth, ‘The Elasticity of Mens Rea’, in C.F.H. Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and Punishment 
(Butterworths, 1981) 53. 
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narrowly labelled offences are able to convey to both the public and the offender the 
relative seriousness of the offence, whilst also confining the courts’ sentencing powers 
appropriately to the seriousness of the conduct.29 The first role of the principle of fair 
labelling is to ensure that the labels attached to offences (and thereby to offenders) 
adequately describes the type of conduct committed.30  It would be unfair to convict 
of murder a person who has not caused the death of another person,31 since causing 
death is a defining feature of murder. However, the principle of fair labelling32 goes 
beyond this by seeking to draw distinctions between offences with widely differing 
levels of harm or offender culpability. The second role of the principle is therefore to 
ensure that each label appropriately distinguishes different degrees of a type of harm. 
In the context of homicide, the principle has led some to question the fairness of 
convicting of the same offence those who kill in ‘cold blood’ and those who kill a 
relative in an act of mercy: 
 
‘One of the long-standing criticisms of English homicide law is that the crime of 
murder, which is supposed to encompass the most serious forms of homicide, is in 
                                                     
29 A. Ashworth, ‘Taking the Consequences’, in S. Shute, J. Gardner & J. Horder (eds), Action and Value 
in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, 1993) 114. 
30 J. Chalmers & F. Leverick, ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71(2) MLR 217 at 222. 
31 V. Tadros, ‘Fair Labelling and Social Solidarity’, in L. Zedner & J.V. Roberts (eds), Principles and 
Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012) 67 
32 When first imagined, the principle was referred to as ‘representative labelling’; see Ashworth, 
above n.28. Glanville Williams later suggested that the term ‘fair labelling would serve better’; see G. 
Williams, ‘Convictions and Fair Labelling’ (1983) 42(1) CLJ 85 at 85. Fair labelling has since become the 
more widely-used term. 
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some respects defined too widely. Some defendants who are convicted of murder do 
not deserve anything like the same degree of moral censure and level of punishment 
as others.’33  
 
Accordingly, the principle of fair labelling seeks not only to accurately describe the 
offending conduct, but also to distinguish between acts that could be classified under 
the same offence group despite differences in their degree of wrongdoing.34 An unfair 
label risks misrepresenting the nature and seriousness of the offender’s conduct, 
thereby potentially misleading the public into believing that the conduct was more 
serious than it in fact was.35 Fair labelling does not only have to be considered from 
the offender’s perspective. An unfair label may also affect the victim of the offence by 
failing to properly reflect the wrong that they have suffered.36 In addition to these 
normative concerns, there are also practical justifications for adherence to the 
principle of fair labelling. The criminal label attached to the person is important for 
determining the maximum penalty available to the court upon conviction, whilst also 
establishing the relevance of any previous convictions, and the classification of prison 
in which the offender will serve his sentence in the event that a custodial sentence is 
                                                     
33 Chalmers & Leverick, above n.30 at 246. See also B. Mitchell & J.V. Roberts, Exploring the 
Mandatory Life Sentence for Murder (Hart, 2012) 7 
34 H.M. Zawati & T.A. Doherty, Fair Labelling and the Dilemma of Prosecuting Gender-Based Crimes at 
the International Criminal Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2014) at 26 
35 Chalmers & Leverick, above n.30 at 226 
36 Tadros, above n.31 at 68 
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imposed.37 In addition, the label may lead to the offender being be shunned by the 
community, ultimately raising greater challenges to securing future employment.38 A 
label which accurately and precisely describes the nature and seriousness of the 
conduct helps to ensure that accurate records are kept, and reduces the likelihood of 
misrepresenting the nature or seriousness of the offender’s conduct. 39 
 
Robbery and fair labelling 
The current definition of robbery clearly violates of the principle of fair labelling. The 
offence carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, and conjures up an image of 
an armed raid by a masked gang seeking substantial gains.40 Yet, as already outlined, 
the offence is also made out by a slight push used in order to snatch a bag from the 
victim’s possession. The single ‘robbery’ label does not reflect the obviously different 
degrees of force used or threatened in these very different cases. Ashworth has 
argued that an offence as broad and undifferentiated as robbery should be rejected 
on the basis that it: 
 
‘…fails to mark in a public way the distinction between a mere push and serious 
violence, and because the label ‘robbery’ is therefore too vague and too liable to 
                                                     
37 A. Ashworth & J. Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2013), p.77 
38 Tadros, above n.31 at 70 
39 Ashworth, above n.28 at 56 
40 Ibid. at 56 
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stereotypical interpretations – some may assume that serious violence, or a weapon, 
was involved when this was not necessarily the case.’41  
 
He continues to say that whilst robbery is often regarded as a serious offence, this is 
only true of some robberies: others involve only a small theft with only slight force 
which itself would not amount to anything more than an assault or battery.42 Indeed, 
there are other robberies in which the threatened use of force need not amount to a 
criminal offence at all: to be guilty of an assault, the defendant must cause the victim 
to apprehend immediate and unlawful violence,43 but a person can be guilty of 
robbery even where the threatened use of force does not lead the victim to 
apprehend violence.  
 
According to the principle of fair labelling, offences should reflect meaningful 
distinctions in the public mind between types of culpable wrongdoing. Offences 
should be drafted to distinguish significant differences in harmfulness, wrongdoing, 
and culpability.44 Green and Kugler’s study on the public’s perception of the 
seriousness of property offences offers some evidence of noticeable distinctions in 
                                                     
41 Ashworth, above n.1 at 856 
42 Ibid. 
43 R v Ireland [1998] AC 147 




the public mind between robberies involving varying degrees of harm and wrong.45 
The study asked 166 respondents to rank different property offences by seriousness. 
On average, the respondents regarded armed robbery (involving the threatened use 
of a gun in order to steal property) as more than four times more serious than simple 
robbery (involving the snatching of the same property).46 Both offences would fall 
within the current English definition of robbery, yet the perceived difference in 
seriousness between the two forms of robbery was, according to the study’s 
respondents, greater than the difference between simple robbery and any other form 
of theft. 
 
This suggests that robbery is currently too wide and should be narrowed or subdivided 
in order to properly reflect the extent of the force used or threatened. An argument 
could also be made in favour of redrafting the offence of theft – itself a constituent 
element of robbery – so as to reflect the difference between a low-value taking and a 
high-value theft,47 but this is probably secondary to the issue of violence which will 
often represent the more serious element of the robbery and which ultimately 
explains the disparity between the maximum penalty for theft and that of robbery. 
Fair labelling is already adopted for non-fatal offences against the person, and there 
would surely be little – if any – support for a single all-encompassing offence of using 
                                                     
45 S.P. Green & M.B. Kugler, ‘Community Perceptions of Theft Seriousness: A Challenge to Model 
Penal Code and English Theft Act Consolidation’ (2010) 7(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 511 
46 Ibid. at 527 
47 J. Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2016) 428 
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force against another person,48 yet where the force is used in conjunction with a theft, 
that is precisely what the law currently provides: a single offence which does not 
differentiate the extent of the force used. 
 
As has already been established, there is no minimum level of force required in order 
to convict a person of robbery; even the slightest nudge or push would entitle the jury 
to convict of robbery instead of the less serious offence of theft. Imagine a fairly typical 
street theft: a person is standing at a bus stop with a shopping bag placed at her feet. 
Concealed from her, another person approaches from behind, snatches the bag from 
the ground, and runs off. Here it is likely that the offender would be charged with 
theft; there is no force used against the person because the shopping bag is not in the 
immediate possession of the victim at the time of the theft. Alternatively, imagine that 
our victim is holding the bag in her hand whilst waiting at the bus stop. As before, the 
offender approaches from behind and snatches the bag – this time from the victim’s 
hand. The fact that the assailant approaches from behind might mean that the victim 
was unaware of his presence, and she may not have put up much resistance against 
the grabbing. Nevertheless, the offender in this instance could be convicted of 
robbery: he has used force to facilitate the theft and the victim’s apparent 
unawareness of the impending taking would not preclude a robbery charge. Whilst 
the latter case would certainly be regarded as more serious than the former, it is 
questionable whether the relatively limited force used in order to steal the bag from 
the victim’s hand should be sufficient to elevate the offence from theft to robbery, as 
                                                     
48 Ibid. at.409  
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the minimal force used may not adequately change the nature of the offence from a 
simple theft.49 Moreover, the offence could quite adequately be dealt with under the 
law of theft by regarding the use of force as an aggravating factor, whilst still 
sentencing the offender within the seven year maximum for theft.     
 
Reform 
There are strong arguments in favour of reforming the current law on robbery based 
on the principle of fair labelling. If it is accepted that the offence is in need of reform, 
a number of options might be considered. This part considers a number of possible 
options for reform and examines the merits of each.  
 
One radical solution would be to abolish the offence of robbery and instead rely on 
the offence’s constituent parts – namely theft and assault. There is some academic 
support for this suggestion, chiefly by Paul Robinson who has argued that: 
 
                                                     
49 A.T.H. Smith claims there is a strong argument that force used merely to obtain possession and not 
to overcome or prevent resistance is not sufficient for robbery, as it was manifestly not the 
legislature’s intention that section 8 of the Theft Act would cover every theft involving asportation 
from the victim should amount to robbery. See Smith, above n.8 at.405. For a similar, Australian, 
perspective, see C.R. Williams, Property Offences (LBC, 3rd ed, 2009) 197-198.  
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‘…creation of a robbery offence adds nothing to the law’s statement of prohibited 
conduct; the theft and assault prohibitions already clearly criminalise the conduct 
described in the robbery offence.’50  
 
However, some might suggest that this disaggregation approach fails to appreciate 
what is distinctive about robbery: the offence is not simply the sum of a theft with 
assault; it is a distinct wrong which ‘is not ultimately reducible to its constitutive 
elements.’51 Divorcing the assault from the theft fails to appreciate the causal 
relationship between the two; it is not enough that the theft and assault simply 
coincide.52 Robbery is only made out where force is used or threatened in order to 
facilitate the theft. The proposal to abolish the offence of robbery would lead to 
current robberies being charged in the same manner as cases where the defendant 
assaults the victim and then opportunistically steals his property,53 or where a person 
                                                     
50 P.H. Robinson, P.D. Greene, & N.R. Goldstein, ‘Making Criminal Codes Functional: A Code of 
Conduct and a Code of Adjudication’ (1996) 86 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 304 at 309-
310 
51 S.P. Green, Thirteen Ways to Steal a Bicycle (2012, Harvard University Press) 92; see also Simester & 
Sullivan, above n.44 at 195 
52 See R v Hale (1978) 68 Cr App R 415, which decided that where the defendant has appropriated 
goods in a house, the theft continues while he removes the goods from the premises, so he may be 
guilty of robbery if he uses or threatens to use force in order to get away with the goods. 
53 Cases of opportunistic thefts following an assault do not satisfy the definition of robbery: see R v 
Vinall & J [2012] EWCA Crim 2652 in which it was held that the offender could not be guilty of robbery 
as the force had not been used to facilitate the theft. Rather, the subsequent theft was opportunistic 
and the intention to steal the property had not been formed at the time of the assault. 
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commits a theft alongside a distinct and unrelated assault. A further objection to this 
proposal is that the offence of assault is not an essential element of robbery54: the 
force used in pursuit of the robbery need not constitute an assault, and the threatened 
use of force may not warrant criminalisation at all since there are no general offences 
of threatening to use force other than common assault and threatening to kill or inflict 
serious injury.55 This leaves a middle ground, between threats of minor harm 
constituting common assault, and more serious threats to kill or inflict serious injury, 
for which a new offence would be required. Ashworth has argued that this gap ought 
to be closed through the creation of a new offence, suggesting that, were this to 
happen, there would be a strong argument that the offence of robbery would become 
obsolete.56 But this implies that robbery exists only in order to fill a lacuna in the law 
where the threat falls between the two criminalised extremes of common assault or 
a threat to kill. Surely it cannot be right to suggest that robbery – as an indictable 
offence carrying a maximum of life imprisonment – is to be used only where the threat 
made is not sufficiently serious to constitute a threat to kill, particularly given that 
threats to kill are triable either way and carry a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment, 
substantially less than the maximum for robbery.57  
 
                                                     
54 R v Tennant [1976] Crim LR 133 
55 Hoder, above n.47 at.409 
56 Ashworth, above n.1 at 863 
57 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s.16 
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An alternative solution would be to divide the broad offence of robbery into narrower 
types, based on the degree of force used or threatened. This would allow the law to 
distinguish robberies involving the use or threatened use of lesser degrees of force 
from those involving significant violence or the use of firearms. Ashworth has argued 
that ‘consideration must be given to dividing the offence [of robbery] so as to mark 
out as particularly serious those robberies which involve the use or threat of serious 
violence.’58 Stuart Green has similarly proposed a system by which robberies are 
graded according to offence seriousness. He suggests two forms of robbery: 
aggravated or armed robbery for thefts that involve the use of a weapon or the 
infliction, or threat, of immediate serious bodily injury, and simple robbery covering 
thefts committed through the infliction or threat of non-serious bodily injury.59 One 
difficulty with this proposal is that the label ‘robbery’ carries connotations of a serious 
offence,60 and division of the offence into narrower categories which retain the 
robbery label (eg ‘simple robbery’ and ‘aggravated robbery’) would not necessarily 
redress the perception of seriousness.61 This could be overcome through the creation 
of a new offence, which avoids the use of the stigmatic robbery label; perhaps 
‘aggravated theft’, ‘theft aggravated by assault’ or ‘assault in the course of a theft’. 
Each of these would signify that the offence involved an element of violence, but 
would avoid use of the term ‘robbery’ and its associated connotations. Any use of the 
                                                     
58 Ashworth, above n.1 at 856 
59  Green,above n.51 at.63 
60 Ashworth, above n.1 at 871 
61 Simester & von Hirsch, above n.44 at 203 
20 
 
term ‘robbery’ to describe the less serious forms of the offence risks misrepresenting 
the seriousness of the offence and may ultimately ‘have a more detrimental effect on 
the offender’s prospects and reputation’ than is deserved.62 
 
Glanville Williams argued it would be both impractical and undesirable to fragment 
offences into a series of narrow offences which – in the case of robbery - are 
distinguished on the basis of the level of force used.63 This fragmentation would add 
to the jury’s task and would increase the chance of an ‘unmeritorious defence’.64 At 
the heart of Williams’ criticism is the impact that offence definitions have on the 
prosecution’s duty in establishing guilt: if offences are defined very broadly, the 
prosecution’s task is eased, but the opposite becomes true if offences are defined 
narrowly.65 The creation of many narrow offences risks overcomplicating the law by 
raising ‘needless arguments about the appropriate charge in respect of indisputably 
criminal conduct’.66  On the other hand, some might question the fairness of the law's 
generality which is defended primarily on the basis of convenience for the 
prosecution.67 
                                                     
62 Chalmers & Leverick, above n.30 at 242 
63 The Criminal Law Revision Committee was similarly opposed to creating various grades of robbery 
‘in accordance with our policy to simplify the law by avoiding unnecessary distinctions between 
offences’, see Criminal Law Revision Committee, above n.7 at para. 66. 
64 G. Williams, above n.32 at 93 
65 Ibid. 
66 Chalmers & Leverick, above n.30 at.239 




A third option for reform would be to introduce a minimum level of force to the 
definition of robbery, thereby narrowing the scope of the offence and preserving it for 
the more serious examples involving higher degrees of force and corresponding 
threats. Any offence involving force falling below the minimum level would not 
constitute robbery and instead would be charged as theft, with the use of force 
constituting an aggravating factor. Under the Model Penal Code, only those thefts 
which involve the infliction or threat of immediate ‘serious bodily injury’ are regarded 
as robbery and therefore subject to greater punishment. If the theft involves only 
minimal force, the Model Penal Code treats it as an ‘ordinary theft’. In contrast to the 
option of introducing a new offence of theft aggravated by assault, this solution does 
not require any new offences to be enacted, and thereby benefits from a simpler 
framework as the prosecuting bodies would only need to determine whether the 
offence constituted a theft or a robbery.  
 
Minimal use of force 
If a minimum force threshold was introduced into robbery, any offence involving less 
than the required minimum level of force would fall outside of the scope of robbery 
and could instead be charged as theft, with the use of force - however slight - would 
constituting an aggravating factor to be taken into consideration at sentencing. 
Provision for this is currently made in the existing sentencing guidelines for theft. 
According to these, the use or threatened use of force during a theft demonstrates a 
high degree of culpability, which places the offence within the highest of the three 
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culpability categories.68 In addition, the risk or infliction of injury to persons during a 
theft constitutes a higher than normal degree of harm, and has the effect of pushing 
the offence into a higher harm category than it would otherwise fall within.69 
Therefore, where a theft involves the use or threatened use of force which causes or 
risks injury to another person, the sentencing guidelines regard this as aggravating 
both the offender’s culpability and the level of harm caused or risked. This is likely to 
have a significant impact on the sentence imposed. If we assume a somewhat typical 
theft against the person committed on the street where the property stolen is worth 
less than £500 and in which there are no other obvious aggravating or mitigating 
factors, the sentencing guidelines prescribe a community order as a starting point, 
with a sentence ranging from a fine to a community order.70 Were this same offence 
also to involve the use or threatened use of force causing or risking injury, the 
guidelines point to a starting point of one year imprisonment, with a sentence range 
of 26 weeks’ to two years’ imprisonment.71 This is broadly similar (although narrower) 
to the range prescribed in the sentencing guideline for robbery, which prescribes, for 
the least serious form of robbery, a starting point of one year imprisonment and a 
range from a high-level community order to three years’ imprisonment.  The 
sentencing guideline for theft therefore anticipates that the use of force will have a 
significantly aggravating effect, enough to push the offence over the custody 
                                                     
68 Sentencing Council, Theft Offences: Definitive Guideline (Sentencing Council, 2015) at 3 
69 Ibid. at 4 
70 Ibid. at 5 
71 Where the force used or threatened does not result in the risk of or actual injury to another, the 
maximum prescribed by the guidelines is 36 weeks’ imprisonment.  
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threshold. Conversely, where force is not used during a low-value theft against the 
person, the guidelines imagine that our theoretical offender would be spared prison 
and would instead by dealt with by way of a non-custodial penalty.  
 
The current theft sentencing guidelines therefore show how the use or threatened 
use of force during a theft can be treated as an aggravating factor of theft rather than 
charging with the more serious offence of robbery. Of course, there are times when 
the level of force used will warrant a robbery charge, but where only minimal force is 
used or threatened, the force used can be taken into account during sentencing for 
theft without recourse to a robbery conviction. This would more adequately reflect 
the seriousness of the offence and would satisfy the principle of fair labelling.  
 
Threatened use of force 
Instances involving the actual use of force should be regarded as more serious than 
where the same level of force is merely threatened.72 Since the proposal made here is 
to introduce a minimum level of force to the offence of robbery, should the 
threatened use of force –however severe - be discounted from the definition? The 
threat of very little force is perhaps unlikely to result in a robbery; a threat of ‘give me 
your wallet or I will tap you on your nose!’ is unlikely to instil such fear into the victim’s 
mind that he actually proceeds to hand over his wallet. In order for the threat to 
                                                     
72 Ashworth, above n.1 at.864; A. von Hirsch & N. Jareborg, ‘Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard 
Analysis’ (1991) 11(1) OJLS, pp.30-31. 
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facilitate the theft, the level of force threatened must be sufficient for the victim to 
relinquish his property.  
 
Whilst the actual use of force might be regarded as more serious than the threatened 
use of force, some threats could be particularly serious and should rightly be sufficient 
for the purposes of robbery. Entering a bank whilst brandishing a firearm is one 
obvious example of a particularly serious threat, and the potential conviction for 
robbery should not be contingent on whether the gun is fired. That is to say, the 
inherent threat posed by the apparent possession of a firearm should suffice for 
robbery. Equally, if the offender is carrying an imitation firearm, or if he has a real gun 
loaded with only blank cartridges which is incapable of being discharged, the victim’s 
perception of the use of force will be very real, and that itself should satisfy the 
definition of robbery, despite the fact that the firearm poses no real danger.  
 
Ashworth has suggested that if causing fear is generally regarded as less serious than 
causing injury, then the law ought to also draw a distinction between causing fear with 
a real firearm, and causing fear with an imitation firearm since a real firearm is capable 
of causing an injury which the imitation is not.73 He suggests that the amount of fear 
in both cases will be the same as victims will rarely realise that the firearm is merely 
an imitation. Yet the potential for actual injury will be significantly greater if the 
offender holds a real gun capable of discharge, rather than an imitation, a ‘toy gun or 
                                                     
73 Ashworth, above n.1 at.864 
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even a banana or cucumber in a bag.’74 There is strength in the argument that causing 
fear with the potential for actual danger is more serious than causing fear without 
such risk of danger, but distinguishing threats of real from impossible danger through 
the creation of a further grade of robbery (if this is what Ashworth proposes), is 
perhaps unnecessary. Offenders who make threats with the use of real or imitation 
firearms can both be regarded as robbers without sacrificing the principle of fair 
labelling, and the distinctions in the levels of harm caused or risked could be dealt with 
at the sentencing stage. Those who use a real firearm during the course of a robbery 
could be liable to a sentence premium over those who use an imitation in order to 
reflect the additional risk posed by the authentic firearm.75 
 
Conclusions 
One of the major functions of the criminal law is to provide a proportionate response 
to crime and criminality.76 Criminal offences are categorised to symbolise the differing 
degrees of moral wrongfulness and relative gravity of different types of conduct,77 but 
this symbolic declaratory function cannot be conveyed adequately through broad 
                                                     
74 Ibid. 
75 The possession of a firearm or imitation firearm is also likely to give rise to a separate offence under 
the Firearms Act 1968, principally section 16 possession with intent to injure, section 16A possession 
with intent to cause fear of violence, or section 18 carrying a firearm with criminal intent. 
76 B. Mitchell, ‘Minding the Gap in Unlawful and Dangerous Act Manslaughter: a moral defence for 
one-punch killers’ (2008) 72(6) Journal of Criminal Law 537 at.547 
77 Mitchell, above n.9 at 398 
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uninformative labels.78 There is a stark difference between tugging a bag from the 
victim’s hand and robbing a bank whilst in possession of a firearm, yet both are 
covered by the single offence of robbery.79 The function of fair labelling is to ensure 
that distinctions in the nature and gravity of behaviour are marked out in the offence 
committed through the label used to describe the conduct and the offender.80 
 
This article has argued for the recognition of a minimum force threshold within the 
definition of robbery in adherence to the principle of fair labelling, thereby ensuring 
that only offences which meet this minimum force threshold are described as 
robberies. Fair labelling has been criticised as leading to ‘an unnecessary multiplicity 
of offences, each based on very narrow definitions and reflecting minute variations 
between factual situations.’81 But this objection would not apply to the proposal made 
here. Aligning the definition of robbery to the principle of fair labelling by 
incorporating a minimum force threshold does not require the creation of any new 
offences. That said, a graded system akin to that proposed by the likes of Stuart Green 
and Andrew Ashworth need not require a deluge of new forms of robbery either. After 
all, Green proposes only two forms of robbery: simple and aggravated. Arguably the 
principle of fair labelling should seek only to distinguish between significant 
                                                     
78 C.M.V. Clarkson, ‘Theft and Fair Labelling’ (1993) 56 MLR 554 at.555. 
79 D.J. Baker, Glanville Williams’ Textbook of Criminal Law (2015, 4th edition, Sweet and Maxwell) 
1343. 
80 J. Horder, above n.26 at 342 
81 Mitchell, above n.9 at 411 
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differences in the nature or wrongfulness of conduct.82 This article has sought to 
establish an argument that the use or threat of minor force does to adequately change 
the nature of the offence such that the charge against the offender should be uplifted 
from theft to robbery.   
 
Having argued for the recognition of a minimum force threshold, one obvious matter 
remains: if the law should distinguish between levels of force which are capable of 
amounting to robbery and those that are not, where should the line of demarcation 
fall? At what point does the level of force become sufficient for robbery? If the 
minimum force threshold is drawn low on the force-spectrum, robbery would remain 
a relatively wide offence since a broad range of degrees of force would suffice for 
robbery. According to Simester and von Hirsch, the law must occasionally accept some 
over-inclusive criminal prohibitions as it will often be impractical to draft offences 
which encompass all – but only – instances of conduct to which a particular offence 
should be aimed.83 On the other hand, if the threshold was drawn higher on the force-
spectrum, robbery would become a narrow offence reserved only for the most serious 
forms of violence. This would mean that thefts involving a moderate level of force 
would not constitute a robbery, yet labelling such behaviour as a mere theft would 
also contravene fair labelling and would not reflect the type of conduct experienced 
by the victim.  
 
                                                     
82 Simester & von Hirsch, above n.44 at 204 
83 Ibid. at 208 
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Wherever the force-threshold may fall, the argument made here is that the minimal 
force used in Dawson & James and bag-snatchings with little or no victim resistance 
should not amount to robberies. The principle of fair labelling requires that offences 
be labelled and defined in such a way as to convey accurately the nature and 
seriousness of the conduct, ensuring that the label does not mislead through 
vagueness or over-generalisation.84 The force-threshold should therefore be drawn at 
a point where the force changes the nature of the offence from a theft aggravated by 
force, to a robbery. 
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